A suitable unified statistical formulation of quantum and classical mechanics in a * -algebraic setting leads us to conclude that information itself is noncommutative in quantum mechanics. Specifically we refer here to an observer's information regarding a physical system. This is seen as the main difference from classical mechanics, where an observer's information regarding a physical system obeys classical probability theory. Quantum mechanics is then viewed purely as a mathematical framework for the probabilistic description of noncommutative information, with the projection postulate being a noncommutative generalization of conditional probability. This view clarifies many problems surrounding the interpretation of quantum mechanics, particularly problems relating to the measuring process.
INTRODUCTION
There are several problems surrounding the interpretation of quantum mechanics, mainly involving the measuring process: What does the collapse of the wave function mean? What causes it? And so on. In this paper we argue that many of these problems are essentially present in classical mechanics as well. If one accepts that the nature of information in quantum mechanics differs from that in classical mechanics in the way to be explained below, then quantum mechanics does not introduce conceptual problems not already present in the measuring process in classical mechanics.
In classical mechanics a measurement is nothing strange. It is merely an event where the observer obtains information about some physical system. A measurement therefore changes the observer's information regarding the system. One can then ask: What does the change in the observer's information mean? What causes it? And so on. These questions correspond to the questions above, but now they seem tautological rather than mysterious, since our intuitive idea of information tells us that the change in the observer's information simply means that he has received new information, and that the change is caused by the reception of the new information. We will see that the quantum case is no different, except that the nature of information in quantum mechanics differs from that in classical mechanics. We now first describe the basic idea.
Let's say an observer has information regarding the state of a classical system, but not necessarily complete information (this is the typical case, since precise measurements are not possible in practice). Now the observer performs a measurement on the system to obtain new information (for example he might have information regarding a particle's position, now he measures the particle's momentum). The observer's information after this measurement then differs from his information before the measurement. In other words, a measurement "disturbs" the observer's information.
In classical mechanics we know that an observer's information isn't merely disturbed, but is actually increased by a measurement (assuming the measurement provides new information). We will view this as an assumption regarding the nature of information which does not hold in quantum mechanics. On an operational level, this can be seen as the essential difference between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics: In both quantum and classical mechanics the observer's information is disturbed (changed) by a measurement if the measurement provides new information, but in classical mechanics the observer's information before the measurement is still valid after the measurement, while in quantum mechanics this is not necessarily the case. (Also see Heisenberg. (1) ) In Section 2 we show how this point of view is actually an outgrowth of the mathematics of quantum and classical mechanics formulated statistically in a suitable (and general) way in terms of * -algebras. Mathematically speaking, an observer's information in quantum mechanics is noncommutative, while in classical mechanics it is commutative. Section 3 shows how the idea of noncommutative information can clarify conceptual problems surrounding the measuring process in quantum mechanics.
PROBABILISTIC DESCRIPTION OF IN-FORMATION
In this section we present a unified statistical setting for quantum and classical mechanics using the language of * -algebras. We consider a physical system (quantum or classical), and an observer who can perform measurements on the system. Our goal is essentially to describe the observer's information regarding the system. In this vein we say that:
A measurement is by definition the reception of information by the observer.
Of course, we have to assume that a measurement is accurate (i.e. the information is correct), even though the measurement may not be precise (i.e. the information is not complete), for example when the position of a particle is measured, a set of possible values is obtained rather than a single value, but the value of the position at the time of the measurement is contained in this set.
We will view all measurements as yes/no experiments. For example, if a particle's position is measured, and the only information the observer gets is that the position is somewhere in the interval [a, b], then we view this as a "yes" obtained for the yes/no experiment "Is the particle's position in [a, b] ?" Furthermore, we assume that a measurement is ideal in the sense that a repetition of a yes/no experiment would give the same result (assuming that no time-evolution takes place between the two yes/no experiments). This is related to the accuracy of a measurement mentioned above, since if we say that the information obtained in a measurement is correct, it means that if we could repeat the measurement (yes/no experiment) then we would with probability one get the same result. (We can therefore also view a measurement as a preparation.) Note that in practice it is not necessarily possible to repeat a yes/no experiment, since the second measurement of position, say, might only give an interval overlapping with the interval obtained in the first measurement, rather than giving exactly the same interval (this would depend on the experimental setup however). Below we will be able to give a better formal definition of an ideal measurement.
General structure
Here we treat the general mathematical structure of a statistical setting for mechanics (classical and quantum). We have to give a mathematical description of four things:
(a) The observables of the system (i.e. that which can be measured by the observer).
(b) The state of the system (i.e. the observer's information regarding the system). We can say that by definition the state of the system is a mathematical object which for each possible outcome of each measurement that can be performed on the system, provides the observer with the probability for obtaining that outcome when performing that measurement. The state of the system must be constructed from information gained during measurements previously performed on the system by the observer.
(c) The measuring process. The result of a measurement depends on the state, and on the observable which is measured. The information received by the observer in general changes his information regarding the system. In other words, a measurement generally changes the state.
(d) The time-evolution of the system (dynamics).This describes how the probabilities mentioned in (b) change as we move forward (or backward) in time.
We give the following set of postulates as a mathematical description of (a)-(d):
(i) The observables of the system are described by a unital * -algebra A, called the observable algebra of the system, in the sense that for every yes/no experiment that can be performed on the system at a given point in time, A contains a corresponding projection P , called the projection of the yes/no experiment (at that point in time).
Remark: A * -algebra is a complex vector space with a multiplication law (that need not be commutative) and an adjoint operation A → A * . A *algebra is called unital if it has a unit element 1, meaning 1A = A1 = A for all A in the algebra. A projection is an element P having the properties P 2 = P = P * . See for example Refs. 2 and 3 for more on * -algebras.
(ii) The state of the system is described by a state ω on A such that for every yes/no experiment, ω(P ) is the probability of getting "yes," where P is the projection of the yes/no experiment at the time at which it is performed.
Remark: A state on A is a linear functional ω:A → C which is positive [ω(A * A) ≥ 0] and normalized [ω(1) = 1].
(iii) Suppose the observer obtains a "yes" for a yes/no experiment performed on the system. After the experiment the state of the system is then given by the state ω ′ on A defined by
for all A in A, where P is the projection of the yes/no experiment at the point in time at which the experiment was performed. We can view this as the formal definition of an ideal measurement.
(iv) The time-evolution of the system is given by a one-parameter *automorphism group τ of A, such that if at time 0 the projection of a given yes/no experiment is P , then at time t the projection of the same yes/no experiment will be τ t (P ). (The choice of when time 0 is, is arbitrary, since τ is a group.) So we're using the "Heisenberg picture," namely the timeevolution does not act on the state of the system.
Remark: Mathematically this means that τ t is a * -automorphism [a linear bijection A → A such that τ t (AB) = τ t (A)τ t (B) and τ t (A * ) = τ t (A) * ] for each t ∈ R, with τ 0 the identity mapping on A, and τ t+s = τ t τ s .
These postulates can be viewed as the general structure of mechanics in a statistical setting. We now briefly discuss how quantum and classical mechanics fit into this picture.
Classical mechanics
Assume that the system is classical, and that its phase space is F , which we view purely as a measurable space (in the sense of measure theory; see Ref. 4 for an exposition of the measure theoretic ideas we will use here). The pure state of the system is some point in F . The state of the system represents the observer's information regarding the pure state.
We then take the observable algebra as A = B ∞ (F ), which is the unital * -algebra of all bounded complex-valued measurable functions on F . The multiplication law of A is just pointwise multiplication of functions, and the adjoint operation is simply complex conjugation. Note that A is commutative (or abelian), in other words f g = gf for all f, g ∈ A.
The projections of A are the characteristic functions, which we will denote by χ. For any measurable set S ⊂ F , the characteristic function χ S is the real-valued function on F assuming the value 1 on S, and zero everywhere else. A yes/no experiment can then be viewed as having the form "Is the pure state of the system in S?" and the projection of this yes/no experiment is χ S . This happens as follows: Any observable f of the system can be represented as a measurable function f : F → R. (Note that this function can be unbounded, and is therefore not necessarily contained in A.) If f is measured when the pure state is x, then the result would be f (x). A yes/no experiment concerning this observable in general has the form "Is the value
We can describe the observer's information regarding the pure state of the system by a probability measure µ on F such that µ(S) is the probability that the pure state is contained in the measurable set S. This gives a state ω on A defined by
This indeed describes the system's state in the sense of postulate (ii), since
For the yes/no experiment with projection χ S , postulate (iii) is equivalent to the probability measure changing in the case of a "yes" to µ ′ defined by
for any measurable set U in F . Here µ ′ is the probability measure describing the observer's information after the yes/no experiment. This equivalence, namely that µ ′ is the (necessarily unique) probability measure giving the state ω ′ (g) = gdµ ′ on A satisfying Eq. (1), follows from standard measure theoretic arguments involving Lebesgue convergence. From Eq. (2) it is clear that in the classical case postulate (iii) is merely a conditional probability. We therefore view postulate (iii) as a generalization of a conditional probability to the case where the observable algebra can be noncommutative (as is the case for quantum mechanics discussed below).
The time-evolution of the system is given by a flow T t : F → F which for every t ∈ R maps measurable sets to measurable sets, and has the group property T s+t = T s T t with T 0 the identity mapping on F (which implies that T t is bijective for every t). This indeed defines a one-parameter *automorphism group on A by the Koopman (5) construction
which then gives the time-evolution in the sense of postulate (iv).
It should be clear that what we have described here is little more than probability theory. Physics really only enter once we specify F and T t . Even so, this is how the general structure can be used as a statistical setting for classical mechanics.
Quantum mechanics
Assume that the system is quantum mechanical, and that its state space is H, which is a Hilbert space (for example an L 2 -space containing wave functions). We then take the observable algebra as A = L(H), which is the unital *algebra of all bounded linear operators H → H. Since the observables of the system (represented as linear operators in H) can be unbounded, they are not necessarily contained in A. Rather, A contains the spectral projections of the observables. The multiplication law of A is usual multiplication of operators, and the adjoint operation is the usual Hilbert adjoint. Note that A is noncommutative, in other words there are A and B in A such that AB = BA. (We are assuming that H is a non-trivial state space, that is to say its dimension is greater than one.)
We can describe the observer's information regarding the system by a density operator (or density matrix) ρ on H. For the yes/no experiment with projection P , postulate (iii) is equivalent to the well known projection postulate
of quantum mechanics, where ρ ′ is the density operator describing the observer's information after a "yes" was obtained for the yes/no experiment. The equivalence follows from the fact that if Tr(ρ 1 A) = Tr(ρ 2 A) for all A ∈ L(H) for two density operators ρ 1 and ρ 2 on H, then setting
where · 1 denotes the trace-class norm. (3) Hence (ρ 1 −ρ 2 ) 2 = 0 and therefore ρ 1 − ρ 2 2 = (ρ 1 − ρ 2 ) 2 = 0, where · denotes the usual operator norm. So ρ 1 = ρ 2 , proving the equivalence, namely that ρ ′ is the unique density operator insuring that ω ′ (A) = Tr(ρ ′ A) satisfies Eq. (1).
Eq. (3) of course contains the projection postulate for a state vector (and in particular the collapse of a wave function) as a special case. [One can in fact also work the other way around, deriving postulate (iii) from the projection postulate for a state vector in Hilbert space, through a heuristic argument using the GNS construction. (6) ]
Our comments concerning the classical case lead us to conclude that the projection postulate of quantum mechanics is a generalization of conditional probability to the case of a noncommutative observable algebra (also see Bub (7) ).
The time-evolution of the system is given in the sense of postulate (iv) by the one-parameter * -automorphism group on A defined by
where H is the Hamiltonian of the system.
Remark: For an observable represented by a (possibly unbounded) selfadjoint linear operator A in H, the projection of the yes/no experiment "Is the value of A in V ?" can be taken as the spectral projection χ V (A) in terms of the Borel functional calculus on self-adjoint operators; see Ref. 8 for the construction of this calculus. Loosely speaking, this projection represents the part of A whose spectrum is contained in the Borel subset V of R. It is interesting to note that this is very similar to the classical case in Subsection 2.2, where we used The * -algebraic (or C*-algebraic) approach to quantum physics is described at length in Haag. (9) 
Information
As mentioned in Subsection 2.2, in the classical case the general structure that we've described is actually just probability theory. One can shift the perspective somewhat by saying that in the classical case this general structure is a probabilistic description of information. We also saw that quantum mechanics has exactly the same the general structure, except that it is noncommutative. In particular, the projection postulate of quantum mechanics is a noncommutative conditional probability. The mathematics therefore seem to tell us that the general structure of quantum mechanics is a mathematical framework for the probabilistic description of noncommutative information. This noncommutative nature of information in quantum mechanics is what causes the essential difference between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics.
We can view (i)-(iv) as the abstract axioms for a probabilistic description of information, where the information can be noncommutative. Axiom (iii) is then a (noncommutative) conditional probability describing how information changes when new information is received. (Also see Ref. 10 for a short survey of the closely related idea of noncommutative conditional expectations.) If we were to add the assumption that the observable algebra is commutative, then we get an abstract formulation of classical probability theory with the usual conditional probability. The algebras B ∞ (F ) and L(H) are nothing more than convenient representations (of the commutative and noncommutative cases respectively), suitable for doing physics.
THE MEASURING PROCESS
Interpreting quantum mechanics as a probabilistic description of noncommutative information, implies that an (ideal) measurement disturbs an observer's information, rather than disturbing the system as is often argued (for example in Ref. 11 ). This renders many problems surrounding the measuring process in quantum mechanics no more difficult than in classical mechanics. The answer to both question at the beginning of this paper is simply that the observer received new information (i.e., the observer made a measurement), exactly as for the corresponding classical questions. (In particular this means that consciousness has no role to play in the measuring process. The observer could be a computer connected to a measuring instrument, or the measuring instrument itself, as long as it can receive information from the system.) We give a few more examples:
(a) The Heisenberg cut. This refers to an imaginary dividing line between the observer and the system being observed (see for example Refs. 12 and 9). It can be seen as the place where information crosses from the system to the observer, but it leads to the question of where exactly it should be; where does the observer begin? In practice it's not really a problem: It doesn't matter where the cut is. It is merely a philosophical question which is already present in classical mechanics, since in the classical case information also passes from the system to the observer and one could again ask where the observer begins. The Heisenberg cut is therefore no more problematic in quantum mechanics than in classical mechanics.
(b) When does the collapse of the wave function take place and how long does it take? This is essentially the Heisenberg cut with space replaced by time. One can pose the question as follows: When does an observer "absorb" the information (i.e., when does the measurement take place), and how long does it take? Again the quantum case is no different from the classical case, and moreover, in practice it is no more of a problem than in the classical case.
(c) Continuous observation (see Refs. 13 and 14 for example). The ideal measurement discussed in Section 2 refers to a single measurement made at some point in time. It can therefore not be applied directly to continuous observation, i.e. when the observer's information is continually changing. However, in classical mechanics this is not considered a conceptual problem, since one could in principle describe such a situation as a continual change in the probability distribution (probability measure) describing the information, even though it might be a difficult technical problem in practice. The same is true in quantum mechanics, with the probability distribution replaced by a state representing noncommutative information. (In quantum mechanics however, the idea of continuous observation is probably an idealization, for example watching something without blinking your eyes is not a continuous measurement, since the photons registered by your retina are discrete.)
The "paradox of the watched pot that never boils" (called Zeno's paradox by Misra and Sudarshan (15) ) is resolved by noting that if an observer continuously measures a certain observable, then the system can still evolve in time to produce other values for the observable if the measurement is not precise (as is typically the case). Say the observer measures an observable A which has a discrete spectrum, and he can only determine its value up to some interval containing (at a point in time) a number of eigenvalues of the observable, say a 1 , ..., a n . Then the state vector is projected onto the subspace spanned by the eigenstates (at that point in time) corresponding to a 1 , ..., a n , in other words, onto the subspace which at that point in time corresponds to the interval (keep in mind that time-evolution acts on the observable algebra, and hence on the eigenstates of the observable). This happens according to postulate (iii); see for example Ref. 16 , pp. 260-266. To clarify our argument, we assume here that before the continuous measurement starts, the observer has maximal information, i.e. his information is a state vector [the general case does not differ significantly, since it is still handled with the same projection postulate (iii)]. Note that the state is now still a state vector, and not a mixture of the eigenstates corresponding to a 1 , ..., a n . The interval which is measured (and hence the eigenvalues of A contained in it) can change in the course of time (for example it can drift up and down the real line), simply because of the lack of precision in the continuous measurement. Therefore the value of A can change within this drifting interval, in turn allowing the drifting interval's average location to change accordingly, which is what the observer sees. In the mathematics this looks as follows: The continuous measurement confines the state vector via the projection postulate to the "drifting" subspace corresponding to the drifting interval. The observable's eigenstates are evolving in time, but since this drifting subspace contains many eigenstates of the observable at any point in time, the projection postulate does not cause the state vector to be "dragged along" by one of the time-evolving eigenstates. Also, since the interval is drifting, eigenstates are moving in and out of the subspace. Therefore the state vector can be projected onto subspaces containing new eigenstates (corresponding to new eigenvalues), with eigenstates brought closer to the state vector by time-evolution having higher probability. (This argument becomes somewhat clearer in the Schrödinger picture, where the eigenstates are fixed, but the subspace is still drifting.)
If the continuous measurement is precise enough, then quantum mechanics indeed predict that "a watched pot never boils" if the observable's eigenvalues are discrete (precise measurement of a continuous observable is impossible in practice). This happens because a quantum measurement can invalidate previous information (i.e. the state vector can change by projection) which then "cancels out" the changes due to time-evolution acting on the observable algebra (and thus on the observable's eigenvectors onto which projection of the state vector occurs). In effect the state vector is dragged along by the time-evolving eigenstate corresponding to the measured value. In classical mechanics on the other hand, previous information is not invalidated by measurement, hence the pure state of a system will not change because of continuous observation, and therefore the values of observables can change as time-evolution acts on the observable algebra. Note that this is true even if the classical observable being observed is discrete (for example "number of particles in the left half of the container"). So no matter how closely we watch a classical pot, it can still boil.
(d) The EPR "paradox." Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (17) described a now famous experiment in which two particles are created together (or interact) and then move away from each other (which ends any interaction between them) before a measurement is performed on one of the particles. This measurement then gives corresponding information about the other particle as well. [This is the result of an entanglement of the two particles' states (for example due to a conservation law), which can occur since the state space is the tensor product of the two particles' state spaces.] EPR argued that this means that the second particle simultaneously has values for two noncommuting observables like position and momentum, since only the first particle is measured (either its position or its momentum is measured, but not both), and hence quantum mechanics must be incomplete, since it says that a particle does not simultaneously have values for position and momentum. They based this on the idea that a measurement on the first particle does not disturb the second. However, we have viewed a measurement as the reception of information by the observer; it has nothing to do with the observer "directly" observing (and disturbing) the system. Measuring the first particle gives the observer information regarding the second particle as well (and hence is a measurement of the second particle), which is mathematically described by the second particle's state vector (representing the observer's noncommutative information about this particle) now being in an eigenspace of the observable which was measured. This is no different from the analogous situation in classical mechanics where for example conservation of momentum can give the second particle's momentum when the first particle's momentum is measured, except that in this case information is commutative.
We can even have two observers A and B measuring the same observable of the two particles respectively. A's measurement is then also a measurement of the value B will get (A receives information about what B's result will be) and so there's nothing strange in them getting correlated results (say opposite values for momentum). No signal need travel faster than the speed of light to B's particle to "tell" it to have the opposite value to A's result, in the same way that no such signal is needed in the classical case. From A's point of view, B is part of the system along with the two particles, and so this experiment is really no different from the original one observer EPR experiment above. The particles along with B are in a superposition of states from A's point of view until A measures his particle, which reduces (by projection) the state vector of the combined system of particles and B, with B then in the eigenspace "B gets the opposite value." (e) System and observer as a combined system (see Ref. 18 , pp. 175-183, for a short and clear discussion). Here the time-evolution of the combined system is supposed to account for the projection postulate of quantum mechanics. This is not possible in a natural way, since time-evolution is the result of a one-parameter * -automorphism group. In classical mechanics the combined system evolves according to classical dynamics (the observer being thought of as a classical system in this case), and this then similarly would have to account for the change in the observer's information via a conditional probability due to a measurement he performs on the system. Again this is not possible in a natural way, since here too we have the same projection postulate, namely the conditional probability (1), acting on the state (of the system without observer), while the time-evolution acts as a one-parameter * -automorphism group on the observable algebra. The solution is that the state of the combined system has to contain from the start the fact that the observer will perform a measurement on the system at a given point in time and will subsequently experience a change of information (this change is a physical process in the observer, described by the combined system's timeevolution, for example some neural activity in a human observer's brain), otherwise such a measurement and the change of information would not take place. This is clear, since time-evolution does not act on the state, but on the observable algebra, hence the state of the combined system is the state "for all time" and does not change when the observer performs a measurement. Exactly the same is true for quantum mechanics (where the observer is then also viewed as a quantum system). The (noncommutative) conditional probability, that is to say the projection postulate, is only relevant when the observer is not considered to be part of the system, in which case the conditional probability says what the change in the observer's information will be, it does not describe the physical process taking place in the observer to accommodate (or store) the new information.
The point we attempt to make with these examples is that, even though there might be certain problems surrounding the measuring process, quantum mechanics does not introduce any conceptual problems not already present in classical mechanics, as long as we assume that information is noncommutative in quantum mechanics.
In connection with the two-slit experiment we can mention the following: Assume that the probability distribution for the position of detection of a particle on the screen in the two-slit experiment is given by an interference pattern when no measurement is performed at the two open slits. This distribution represents the observer's information about where on the screen the particle will be detected. In the light of our discussion thus far, it should then not be too surprising that this distribution (i.e. the observer's information) can be invalidated via the noncommutative conditional probability (1), if the observer does measure through which slit the particle goes (i.e. if the observer receives new information), giving a completely different probability distribution at the screen. This is unlike the classical case where a measurement at the slits gives the observer more information, rather than invalidating previous information. (Also see Ref. 7.) We can also consider the case of more than one observer touched upon in (d). Say three observers A, B and C are observing the same system, but B and C are not aware of each other or of A. B and C measure two noncommuting observables P and Q respectively, in the order P , Q, P , and A in turn measures B and C's results in this order ( he "sees" each of their results at the time they obtain them). We ignore the time-evolution of the system. Say the results are p 1 , q, p 2 (in this order), then clearly p 1 and p 2 need not be the same since P and Q do not commute. So from B's point of view it seems that something disturbed the system between his two measurements of P . However, in our interpretation it is actually B's information that has been invalidated by A and C's measurement of Q. This is not too strange, since B and C are merely A's measuring instruments. One could ask what would happen if A wasn't there. Would B then get p 1 = p 2 with probability one? In the absence of A, does it even make sense to talk of the time order P , Q, P if B and C are not aware of each other? In our interpretation time ordering should probably be viewed as in some way defined by information received by an observer, and in this case it seems possible that B would get p 1 = p 2 with probability one in the absence of A and no other way to define the time ordering. (Note that in the two-slit experiment for example, there is a time ordering in the sense that a measurement on a particle at the slits is performed before a measurement on the same particle at the screen, even if the measurements are performed by two different observers not aware of each other, so the interference pattern at the screen can still be destroyed in this setup.) The idea of defining time ordering in terms of a series of events (an event in our case being the reception of information by an observer) was introduced by Finkelstein. (19) 
DISCUSSION
We have now seen that the general structure of quantum mechanics is actually a mathematical framework for handling noncommutative information, rather than being a physical theory in itself.
If we assume that information in our physical world is described by quantum mechanics, this leads us to conclude that information is actually a noncommutative phenomenon. Perhaps this means that since information "lives" in spacetime (and possibly in some way defines spacetime structure as was alluded to at the end of Section 3), spacetime itself is noncommutative, as has been suggested in attempts to construct quantum spacetime and quantum gravity; see for example Ref. 20 . On the other extreme, the term "noncommutative information" may be a "purely grammatical trick" of the sort Marsden, (21) p. 188, mused might "be the ultimate solution of the quantum measurement problem"; this possibility seems somewhat less interesting however.
It also explains the linearity of quantum mechanics. The general structure of classical mechanics in Section 2 is linear, since it is nothing more than probability theory, even though it can be applied to physical systems where nonlinear aspects might be involved. It is the statistical point of view that makes everything linear (this boils down to the use of averages, which are integrals and hence linear). The same goes for quantum mechanics. Its linear structure should not be viewed as an approximation to an underlying nonlinear world, but simply as a result of the fact that it is a mathematical framework for probability theory (i.e. statistics, averages), where the information involved happens to be noncommutative. The appearance of a Hilbert space as the state space is simply a mathematical way of representing the noncommutative * -algebraic general structure in Section 2. So the linearity of (and hence superpositions in) the state space is just a convenient way to express the fact that a measurement can invalidate the information the observer had before the measurement, or more precisely, to express non-commutative conditional probabilities. Also see Ref. 9, p. 309, and Ref. 22 , p. 175, for similar remarks concerning the linearity of quantum mechanics. A review of quantum mechanics viewed as a generalization of classical probability theory can be found in Ref. 23 .
We cannot claim that this noncommutative information interpretation solves all the conceptual problems of quantum physics, but for the general situation of a quantum mechanical system being observed by an observer, it does seem to clarify many issues without causing any new problems (except if you consider the idea of noncommutative information itself to be a problem).
